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In the past fifteen years, many philosophers and psychologists have discussed
the question of how the human capacity to attribute mental states to other human
beings is best explained.1 On one account – the theory view – it depends
primarily on our possession of a body of knowledge about relationships between
the environment, mediating mental states, and behaviour. An alternative view –
the simulation view – is that possession of a theory does not play this primary
role in explaining our capacity for attributing mental states to other people. On
this view, the capacity in question depends on our having an ability to simulate
other people’s mental processes. Furthermore, our capacity to simulate other
people’s mental processes is not itself to be explained as being the result of our
possession of a body of theoretical knowledge.2
At first sight, this might appear to be a relatively arcane debate, primarily of
interest to specialists in a fairly narrow area of naturalistically inspired
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of cognitive science. In fact, though, its
ramifications run deep. What is at issue is the question of whether our everyday
understanding of other human beings is based on the same sorts of mechanisms
which we bring to bear in our understanding of the natural world or whether it is
sui generis. It is likely that the answer to this question will have implications for a
range of other philosophical issues, such as the epistemology of other minds, the
metaphysics of persons and mental states, and the scientific status of the social
sciences.3
The debate between advocates of the theory and simulation views has mostly
focussed on the question of what is involved in attributing beliefs to other people.
Other kinds of mental states, including emotions, have received less attention.4
This is both surprising and significant. It is often thought that, if true, the
simulationist view must have a certain degree of generality. Without such
generality it could not have the wide ranging consequences it is sometimes
claimed for it. But a simulationist account which is only an account of belief
attribution does not have such generality. Our beliefs do not constitute the sum or
even, necessarily the most important part of our mental lives. Nor is our capacity
to attribute beliefs necessarily the most significant or striking aspect of our ability
to enter into the minds of others.
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Even if we are skeptical about whether the simulationist view does have the
wide-ranging consequences sometimes claimed for it, the question of whether the
simulationist account of belief attribution generalises is still significant. If the
simulationist account cannot be extended to cover the emotions, then it has less
going for it than one of its most important theoretical rivals - the theory view.5 So
even if we are only interested in the theory/simulation debate, and not in its
wider ramifications, the question of whether the simulationist account can be
extended is still an important one.
In this paper I argue that there is indeed a viable simulationist account of
emotion attribution. However, I also try to do more than this: I aim to say
something specific about the form that this account ought to take. I argue that
someone who wants to give by a simulationist account of emotion attribution
should focus on similarities between emotions and perceptual judgments. Since
this claim is central to my position, I shall say something more about it here.
One might hold that the job of extending a simulationist account of belief
attribution to cover emotions was not a particularly difficult one. A striking
feature of many recent philosophical accounts of the emotions is their stress on
the kinship between emotions and cognitive phenomena such as beliefs and
judgments. Indeed some accounts have even gone so far as to suggest that beliefs
might be either partly or wholly constituted by beliefs and judgments. If this
view is correct, then turning a simulationist account of belief attribution into an
account of emotion attribution may involve little more than noting that some
emotions are either identical with, or partially constituted by judgments.
Unfortunately, this line of argument turns out to be unsuccesful. The kinship
between emotions and cognitive phenomena is significant6 and provides us with
some reason for hoping that it will be possible to extend the simulationist account
to cover emotion attributions. However, as I shall try to show, the parallels
between emotions and judgments break down at a key point. The problem is that
emotions do not seem to play the same role in deliberation as beliefs and
judgments typically do.7 It is for this reason that we need to look at the parallels
between beliefs and perceptual states in formulating a version of the simulation
view.8
II
I shall start by giving a fairly schematic characterisation of the simulation and
theory views.9 This will help to give us an idea of the difficulties that lie in the
way of a simulationist account of emotion attributions, and the resources that are
available for overcoming them.
The central idea of the theory view is that our capacity to ascribe mental states
depends on our application of a body of knowledge about mental states and the
causal relationships between them, the environment and behaviour. It is also
typically part of the theory view that the body of knowledge involved has a
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degree of structure, precision and abstraction which make it worth calling it a
theory.10
As Stich and Nicholls (Stich and Nicholls 1995a) point out, we can see the
theory view as an involving an appeal to an explanatory strategy which is more
or less standard in cognitive science. According to Stich and Nicholls, use of
this strategy seems appropriate because there is no obvious reason why an
explanatory strategy which can account for our capacity to judge the gramma-
ticality of a sentence or to follow the trajectory of a flying ball should not succeed
in explaining our capacity to attribute mental states to human beings as well.11
By contrast, the key point of the simulationist position is that our capacity to
ascribe mental states to others can be explained by appeal to our possession of a
capacity to simulate other people’s mental processes. On pain of seeing their
position collapse into a notational variant of the theory view, simulationists also
need to hold that we can possess a capacity for simulation without possessing a
theory about mental states.12 This second claim is defended by appealing to a
distinction between cases where a person’s ability to simulate something
depends on their possessing a theory about it and cases where it does not.
Awell-worn example can illustrate the point. Someone who wants to simulate
the flow of blood in a human being in a scale model will probably need to draw
on some theoretical knowledge about the way in which blood flows in real
human beings in order to construct the model.13 If someone provides me with a
ready made scale model then I do not need much in the way of theory.14
Simulationists hold that when it comes to simulating other people’s mental
processes, I am in the position of someone who has been provided by nature with
something which can function as a scale model, rather than someone who has to
construct one.
Why should we think this is true? A simple answer would be that human
minds are similar to one another in various important respects. However, in what
follows it will be worth distinguishing between three sorts of similarities which
play a part in simulationist accounts of mental state ascription. These are shared
perceptual capacities, shared inferential dispositions, and shared standards of
rationality.15 To the extent that we do share these capacities, dispositions and
standards our minds work in more or less the same way. As a result it is
reasonable to think that when someone is trying to work out what someone else
is thinking, they can make a good start on doing so by considering what they
would think if they were situated as they take another person to be situated.16
III
Much of the debate between advocates of the simulation view and advocates of
the theory view has focused on the question of what is involved in attributing
beliefs to someone else. Given my sketch of the simulationist view, this is
unsurprising. Beliefs are paradigmatic examples of mental states which are
conceptually informed and responsive to perception and norms of rationality.
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Indeed, one might even think that, given some important adjustments having to
do with the role of beliefs in the production of action, there is not much more to
say about them at all. However, for the simulationist view to be at all plausible as
a general account of mental state attribution, there must be at least a possibility of
extending it so that it applies to the emotions.
How easy it will be to make an extension of this sort depends on one’s view of
the emotions, and particular, on the relationship between emotions and other
kinds of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. On the face of it, the
more similarity there is between emotions and other kinds of mental states, such
as beliefs, the easier it will be for an advocate of the simulationist view to fit the
emotions into their account. At first sight, it seems as though the prospects look
good for a simulationist in this area. Many analytic philosophers who have
written on the emotions have defended cognitive theories of the emotions (e.g.
Solomon 1973, Lyons 1980, de Sousa 1987, Greenspan 1989, Nussbaum 1991). It is
characteristic of such theories that they do play up the similarities between
emotions and cognitive mental states – in contrast to older accounts which
emphasized similarities between emotions and sensations. So, for example, we
have treatments of the emotions which focus on the fact that they are intentional
states, that they are subject to rational assessment, that they play a role in
practical reasoning, and so on.
Of course, there are important differences between the different sorts of views
on offer. On some views, emotions are constituted wholly or partly by certain
kinds of belief and desire (Nussbaum 1991, 1994, 2002, Lyons 1980), while on
others, beliefs and desires are necessary but not sufficient for the occurrence of
certain types of emotion;17 on some views assessing the rationality of an emotion
is just a matter of assessing the rationality of its component beliefs and desires
(Solomon 1973) while on others the rationality of emotions is sui generis (de Sousa
1987) and so on. And furthermore, there are important difficulties that any
advocate of a cognitivist account of the emotions needs to face up to-most notably
problems about the phenomenological side of the emotions, and about whether it
is possible to hold that conflicting emotions about a particular situation are
irrational in the way in which conflicting beliefs would be (Greenspan 1984,
1989).
Despite these problems, it is worth considering whether we can formulate an
account of emotion attribution which is compatible with the simulationist view,
and which draws on one or more of the cognitive theories of emotion that are on
offer. Two separate questions need to be addressed here. First, which elements of
the simulationist picture are going to be incorporated into the account of emotion
attribution? Second, which of the many cognitive accounts of emotion is the one
to be preferred?
There are at least two ways in which an advocate of simulationism might try to
incorporate the emotions into their account of mental state attribution. One way
is to focus on the role of emotions in deliberation. This strategy has at least two
variants: it might focus on the emotions as being the end products of deliberation,
or as inputs into it. The first variant seems implausible.18 Emotions do not
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normally strike us as the sort of mental state that is arrived at by deliberation.
This prephilosophical intuition can be backed up by reflecting on the facts that in
many cases emotions come over us suddenly and that we often find it difficult to
give an account of what has led up to them. These are not features that we would
expect emotions to have if they were typically reached by means of deliberation,
for deliberation is normally a self-conscious process and one which the subject of
deliberation is capable of giving some sort of account of. The account may not
follow the details of every train of thought that the deliberator engaged in.
Nevertheless it will normally help to indicate the reasons which the deliberator
takes to support his conclusion.
One objection to this line of thought is that it is not alway implausible to
regard emotions as being arrived at by means of deliberation. Consider a
situation where I am faced by a moral dilemma. For example, suppose I am
wondering how to grade a paper by an able but lazy student. The paper is
philosophically excellent, but has been handed in shortly after a deadline which I
have announced to my students well in advance and which, I have informed my
student, I will apply very strictly. I also know that the student in question is in
danger of having to repeat a year, or face some other fairly stringent penalty if
they do not receive a good mark for the paper. One question I can ask myself is
what I ought to do in such a case. But another question, which I may well ask on
the way to answering this question is ‘How ought I to feel about this?’. Often,
though not invariably, an answer to this question will have an appreciable
bearing on how I do feel.
One response to this sort of case would be to say that it is misdescribed as a
case of wondering what I should feel: it is instead a case of wondering what I do
feel. This seems wrong though. For it may very well be that in such a case
I am perfectly clear about what I do feel (annoyed, perhaps, or alternatively
sympathetic.) What I am wondering about is whether it is reasonable to feel this
way. However it is not clear that even in this sort of a case, we have a case of an
emotion being the conclusion of a deliberation. Another possibility is that the
conclusion of a deliberation was nothing more than a belief about what I ought to
feel, with the appropriate emotion following (if I am lucky) by means of an arational
causal mechanism.
At this point we are near to some deep waters in philosophical psychology.
There is clearly some relationship between the question of whether deliberations
can have emotions as conclusions and the question of whether the conclusion of a
piece of practical reasoning is an action. Those who believe that the answer to the
second question is ‘Yes’ may be sympathetic to the idea that deliberations can
have emotions as conclusions. They may even feel that similar considerations can
be brought to bear in both cases.
Rather than address this issue head on I shall explain why I do not think that
any arguments that could be brought forward at this point will help to support
the view that when we attribute emotions to another person, what we are doing
is simulating a process of deliberation which led up to that emotion. The reason is
that although cases like the one described do occur, they are not typical of cases
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where we attribute emotions. Furthermore, although we can attempt to attribute
emotions to other people in cases like this, they are not the cases in which we are
most likely to make successful emotion attributions. In fact if we do try to work
out what someone feels by focussing on the question of what they are likely to
think they ought to feel we are likely to go astray. For the sad fact is that much of
the time people do not think about what they ought to feel, and what they think
they ought to feel is often not the same as what they actually do feel.
This line of thought is not conclusive, but does suggest that it might be worth
considering a different account of how a capacity to simulate someone’s
deliberations might yield a capacity to ascribe mental states to them. This is that
we might be able to succeed in attributing emotions by considering their role as
inputs into practical reasoning. Robert Gordon (Gordon 1986) has suggested that
our capacity for attributing beliefs and desires might be explained on the basis of
what he calls ‘hypothetico-practical reasoning’19 The idea here is that when we try
to discover what someone believes and wants, we do so by observing a person’s
actions, and running through a number of different processes of simulated practical
reasoning, involving hypothesized beliefs and desires until we come up with one
which yields an action that matches the action we observe. An important feature of
this account is that according to it our capacity for attributing beliefs and desires
derives from a capacity which it is unproblematic to suppose that we have. This is
our capacity for reasoning from hypothetical premises to conclusions about howwe
would act if the world were a certain way. As Gordon observes, our ability to plan
for the future requires us to be able to think in just this way.
There are two ways in which this might yield an account of emotion
attribution. One would be if emotions fed directly into practical reasoning.
Another would be if emotions fed into practical reasoning only indirectly –
through beliefs and desires to which they gave rise. However both of these
models seem to give rise to problems which do not arise in the more
straightforward cases where it is only beliefs and desires that are attributed.
One problem with the first model is that it is not so clear that there is anything
analogous, in the case of emotions to reasoning from a hypothetically held
emotion. A problem with the second model is that although hypothetical
reasoning might enable one to reason back from an action to a set of beliefs and
desires that motivated it, attributing an emotion would involve a second step to
take one from the beliefs and desires to the emotion. This is particularly
problematic if one thinks – as one might – that these beliefs and desires might
underdetermine the experienced emotion – either because two emotions might
give rise to very similar beliefs and desires, or because sufficiently similar beliefs
and desires might arise in emotionally charged situations and in affectless ones.20
IV
These difficulties suggest that it might be worthwhile to adopt an approach
which does not focus on the role which emotions play in reasoning. An
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alternative possibility is to try to exploit an analogy between perceptual and
emotional responses. On one version of the simulation theory – namely, that put
forward by Jane Heal (Heal: 1998) – what enables mental simulation to get off the
ground in the case of beliefs is our capacity for what she calls ‘cocognition’. Her
characterization of cocognition is as follows:
Cocognition is . . . a fancy name for thinking about the same subject
matter. Those who cocognize exercise the same underlying multifaceted
ability to deal with the same subject matter. So for example, two persons
cocognize when each has the same beliefs and interests and reasons to
the same further belief. (Heal 1998: 483)
It seems reasonable to think that one of the many facets of the abilities in question
here is the ability to recognize instances of a concept when presented with them
in perception. So we could describe two peoples recognition of the fact that an
object presented to them in perception falls under a given concept as an instance
of cocognition – or perhaps ‘coperception’.
It seems clear that coperception will have to be part of any plausible
simulationist account of mental state attribution; and it also seems clear that the
phenomenon exists. How can it help us to give an account of emotion
attribution?
A good way of answering this question is to look at an account of emotions
which treats them as being analogous to perceptual responses. One such account
has been put forward by Ronald de Sousa (de Sousa 1987). According to de
Sousa, emotional responses are analogous to judgments involving secondary
quality concepts. Responding emotionally to a situation is analogous to forming a
judgment of that situation to the effect that it is similar in relevant ways to what
de Sousa calls paradigm scenarios for the particular emotion. Paradigm scenarios
are situations which I have been taught to recognize as appropriate for evoking
the emotion in question. So for example, paradigm scenarios for anger are those
in which one is conspicuously wronged and so on.21 This leaves room for the idea
that some emotional responses can be rationally criticized – for example, if the
situation is not sufficiently similar, or not similar in the right respects to the
paradigms – for example, if, in the case of anger, the piece of behaviour that
I have taken as a slight did not occur, or if it was unintentional, or there were
mitigating circumstances and so on – without requiring that emotions be states
that are arrived at by means of full-blooded rational deliberation.
It is worth noticing that on this account the sort of rationality which emotions
may have, or alternatively fail to have, is full-blooded cognitive rationality – of the
sort that beliefs are typically assessed for in theoretical contexts – and not merely
instrumental rationality. That is to say, on this view emotions can be assessed as
responses to features of the world – or at least of the world as it affects us – rather
than as serving or failing to serve goals which we possess independently.
Such an account of the emotions might provide a basis for a simulationist
account of emotion attribution. It has two notable advantages. One is that
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although it is a cognitive account, it does justice to the idea that in many cases we
are not in control of the ways in which we are emotionally affected. That is to say,
it does justice to the idea that in many cases we are passive in the face of our
emotional responses. The analogy with perceptual belief formation seems apt
here. Except metaphorically, we do not normally see what we choose to see. In fact
the analogy can be pressed further, for there are ways in which we can be in
control of our emotional responses which seem to have parallels in the case of
visual perception. We can avert our gaze from something that we do not wish to
acquire perceptual beliefs about, and up to a point at least we can stifle our
emotional responses to situations we do not wish to respond to by refusing to
think about them. Equally we can develop our emotional responses, or allow them
to atrophy in just the way we can develop or spoil our perceptual responses.
One further way in which the analogy between emotional responses and
perceptual ones can be developed, is of particular interest in this context. (This is
the second important advantage of de Sousa’s account.) One weakness of
cognitive accounts of the emotions which I alluded to earlier had to do with what
I described as the affective or phenomenological side of the emotions. This is
particularly true of accounts of emotions that relate them closely to purely
cognitive states. This is because it seems plausible to think of beliefs as being
phenomenologically empty. In other words, most beliefs are such that it does not
make sense to ask what it is like to have that belief. Emotions are very unlike this.
Emotions appear to be very good examples of states where it does make sense to
ask what it is like to be in that state. But de Sousa’s account of emotions seems to
be able to cope with this fact very well. For there are plenty of accounts of
perceptual belief formation according to which there is something which it is like
to form a perceptual belief.22
So one way in which a simulationist account of emotion attribution might be
developed would be to build on the idea of emotions as being quasi-perceptual
responses to the world which different individuals can share. The central idea
here would be that the capacity for attributing emotions to other people depends
on a capacity for responding to emotionally charged situations in the same way.
The reason why it is worth calling it a simulationist account is that on this view –
at least in standard cases – the capacity for attributing emotions to other people
depends on our capacity for responding to emotionally charged situations in
appropriate ways.
A skeptic about the simulationist approach might have an objection at this
point. The objection would be that the account put forward was not really a
simulationist account at all, but a version of the theory view.23 The main ground
for this objection would be that in appealing to an individual’s capacity to learn
appropriate responses to paradigm scenarios, the account proposed equips them
with what is, in effect, a theory about the emotions. In learning to respond to a
situation which another person faced we would, in effect be using the same
theory, but in a slightly different way. The fact that the same capacity was used in
both cases would be pale into insignificance compared with the fact that this
capacity depends on a theory.
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There are two responses to this objection. The first would be to say in teaching
someone how to respond appropriately to certain sorts of situations we are
teaching them something, but that there is no reason to think that what we are
teaching them is a theory. We are certainly teaching them to discriminate between
different sorts of situation, and we may even be regarded as having implicitly
taught a system of categorisation, but there is no reason to think – pace Quine and
others – that every system of classification needs to be backed up by a theory.
Indeed there might be reasons for going further than this. If we are teaching
someone how it is appropriate to respond to certain sorts of situation we are
teaching them something about the normative structure of the world, rather than
its causal structure. So what we have taught them – even if someone insists on
calling it a theory – is very different from theories of the sort which believers in
the theory view have typically postulated to explain our capacity for mental state
attribution.
A second point is this. Compare the proposed account of emotion attribution
with accounts of belief attribution which have been offered by simulationists. In
particular, consider what a simulationist will say about someone who is trying to
attribute to another individual a belief about tables. In order to do this the person
doing the attributor will have to have learnt something about tables. Indeed it
would be natural to say that what they need to know about is tables rather than
beliefs about tables. But in fact, part of the point of the simulationist account is
that in knowing about tables, I already know quite a bit about beliefs about tables
too. However there is no reason to regard this as supporting the theory view.
Instead what it shows is that if we postulate a theory about beliefs about tables in
order to explain someone’s table belief attributions, what we have done is
explanatorily otiose.
We can apply this point to the objection in hand as follows. Suppose that we
concede that in learning how to respond appropriately to emotionally charged
situations, a person has in effect acquired a theory about the emotions. We can
still insist that if we accord this theory an explanatory role in explaining how
someone attributes emotions to another person, we have added something which
is explanatorily superfluous. It is not in virtue of possessing a theory, but in
virtue of knowing how to respond appropriately that an individual acquires the
ability to ascribe mental states to other people.
V
So far I have been arguing at high level of generality. This may be enough to
make the account seem suspect to some people. If the suspicion derives from the
view that generality is always a source of philosophical error then it is self-
refuting. However there are more specific reasons for being suspicious of any
attempt to offer a general account of emotion attribution. There are important
differences between one emotion and another, between different episodes
involving the same emotion, and between different situations in which we are
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able to attribute an emotion to another person. We need to be sure that we are not
distorting the complexities of human emotional and cognitive life by fitting it into
a single pattern.
Paul Griffiths (Griffiths 1997: 14–16, 241–2 and passim) has recently argued that
the various mental states which we call emotions do not form a ‘natural kind’.
Some are hard-wired instinctive responses; some involve substantial amounts of
learned behaviour; some are social constructs with no underlying referent. If
Griffiths is right, then it is hard to see how there could be a unified account of
emotion attribution. If emotions are not a natural kind, then emotion attributions
are not likely to be.
However, matters are not quite so simple as this. For Griffiths does not want to
claim that no two emotions have anything interesting in common. This would be
a highly implausible view. His position is that in order to make any progress in
understanding emotions we need to make a distinction between what he calls
‘Basic Emotions’ or affect programs which include states such as fear, anger,
joy, surprise, disgust, and grief, and ‘Higher Cognitive Emotions’ such as
jealousy, gratitude and love. Nothing that Griffiths says seems to rule out the
possibility that what he calls ‘affect programs’ are a natural kind. If this is right
then there is no reason why an advocate of a simulationist view of the emotions
should not hold that the simulationist account applies only to what Griffiths
calls ‘affect programs’ and not to everything that has been classified as an
emotion.24
It might be objected that this response deprives the simulationist account of a
great deal of its interest. For it might be thought that the emotions which are of
greatest human interest and into which we might have hoped the simulationist
account would provide some insight are not Griffiths’ affect programs, but what
he calls the higher cognitive emotions. In response to this two points can be
made. First, even to have a simulationist account of some forms of emotion
attribution would represent an advance for the simulationist position. Second,
the response is a conditional one. If Griffiths’ account of the emotions is correct
then the simulationist may have to retreat to the claim that the account only
covers affect programs. But in this case, the objection that it fails to provide a
comprehensive account of a group of phenomena of more general interest is
misplaced: ex hypothesi there is no comprehensive account to be made.
That said, an advocate of the simulationist position might reject the claim that
an account which restricted itself in the first instance to what Griffiths calls affect
programs could tell us nothing at all about the higher cognitive emotions. For it
might be that at least some cases of these emotions involve episodes or sequences
of affect programs. For example, most cases of jealousy involve anger and grief,
most instances of gratitude involve pleasure and so on. The suggestion being
made here is a fairly weak one: it is not that higher cognitive emotions can be
analysed as consisting of nothing but sequences of affect programs, but only that
they may be partly constituted by them. If so then it is at least possible that
attributions of these emotions may also sometimes involve the attribution of
contributing affect programs by simulationist means.25
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VI
A further objection to the generality of the account that I have been putting forward
might be based not on differences between emotions but on differences between the
sorts of occasion on which emotions are attributed. For example, there is an
important distinction between attributing an emotion to someone when the stimulus
which elicited that emotion is present, and attributing it when one’s belief about the
existence of the stimulus is based on inference or testimony. It is arguable that there
will be differences between what happens when I hear that a colleague has been
asked to share rooms with someone with whom they do not get on and infer that
they will probably be fairly annoyed, and what happens when I see the same
colleague responding to some verbal needling on the part of the same individual.
An adequate account of emotion attribution has to deal with both sorts of cases.
The account which I have sketched so far can deal more easily with the second
sort of case than with the first. It is easy to see how a shared quasi-perceptual
response can be involved in my attribution of annoyance in the first case because
there is something for me to have a perceptual response to. In the second case there
is not. There is a natural response here however. This is to appeal to the role of
imagination. My suggestion is in effect that the sorts of emotional response that we
need to account for in cases where I attribute an emotion to someone when I am not
in the presence of the stimulus which elicits the emotion are related to actual
emotions in the same way in which visualisation is related to perception.
For this account to be plausible it needs to be the case that by using my
imagination I can become sensitive to features of a situation which are not
mentioned explicitly in the description of the situation which prompts my
imagination. Something like this can clearly happen in the case of visualising a
scene. For example, if I read a description of the appearance of the dome of Hagia
Sophia in the sunlight of a March morning in Istanbul and find myself imaging the
scene, I shall imagine the sky as having some determinate shade of blue, and
different parts of the dome as having different determinate shades of pink; I shall
represent to myself spatial relationships between different parts of the dome which
are not directly mentioned in the description and so on. These features of the scene
may not be explicitly mentioned in the description of the scene. If the analogy
between emotional and perceptual responses is plausible, then we ought to expect
that if a situation which has some sort of emotional significance to it is described to
a person, they may be able to generate the right sort of emotional response to it.
The idea that we are capable of emotional responses to described or imagined
situations is not merely ad hoc.26 It is a commonplace that we are capable of
making emotional responses to works of fiction. It is difficult to see how this
could be possible if we did not have a capacity for making emotional responses to
described or imagined situations. Nor is there any reason to think that the fact
that we are capable of making emotional responses to fiction is incompatible with
the view that emotions are quasi-perceptual responses.
One might think that that there is a problem lurking in the vicinity. Proponents
of cognitive accounts of emotions often have difficulty making their views
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consistent with the idea that we have emotional responses to works of fiction.
Cognitive accounts of emotions often require that for us to have an emotion we
have to have beliefs of a certain sort. For example to grieve for someone we have
to believe that something terrible has happened to her; to be afraid of something,
we have to believe that we are endangered by it. But since readers of Anna
Karenina do not really believe that anything has happened Anna Karenina and
viewers of The Creature from the Black Lagoon do not believe they are in danger
they cannot have the relevant emotions. One might think that a similar problem
arises here: if emotional responses are akin to perceptual responses then
responses to imagined situations cannot involve actual emotions since they do
not involve actual perceptions.
However, the problem is more apparent than actual. One way of resolving it
would to be to accept that when we are responding to imagined situations we
have responses which cannot be regarded as full-blown instances of emotion but
which are analogous to them in important ways. Rather than grieving for Anna
Karenina, I am in a state which bears the same relation to my supposition that
something terrible has happened as an actual emotion would bear to the belief
that soemthing terrible has happened.
In fact, this view has an important advantage as far as the simulationist
account of emotion attribution is concerned. It means for the range of cases which
we are considering in this section, I do not need to have the emotion which I am
attributing to someone else. I do not need to be angry to attribute anger to you,
nor afraid to attribute fear to you. This seems independently plausible: as has
been remarked before (Goldie 1999), if I had to become angry in order to attribute
anger to you, my anger might end up getting in the way of an accurate appraisal
of your emotional state.
VII
Peter Goldie (Goldie 1999) has recently argued that a simulationist account
of emotion attribution is unlikely to be central to a full account of emotion
attribution. His suggestion is that in order for someone to make a succesful
attribution of an emotion to someone by means of mental simulation I will need
to draw on information about a person’s character and situation which need to be
acquired prior to starting on the simulation. I need background information
about a person’s situation because people do not react to emotional stimuli in a
mechanical way: instead emotions have a narrative structure in which our
reaction to one event is likely to be conditioned by our reaction to events which
have gone before; and I need information about a persons character because in
order to make a succesful attribution of an emotion I need to be able to focus on
how they will respond to a situation, which may well be different from how I
would respond to the same situation.
What Goldie says about the conditions for succesful attribution of emotions
seems undeniable. However, it is not obvious that it presents a serious objection to
the simulationist position. Clearly, successful simulations are not likely to take place
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in a vacuum. It is true that an understanding of what someone else believes, desires
and has experienced is likely to make us better at attributing emotions to them. But
there is no obvious reason why this understanding could not have been obtained by
simulationist means. Similar points can be made about the importance of
understanding another person’s character. It is true that if I try to respond to
someone’s bereavement by thinking about how I would react if similarly bereaved
my response is liable to be flat-footed. As Goldie says, what I need to be able to do
is to consider how they might feel. However it does not follow from this that the
information that I need in order to help me imagine how they feel cannot also have
been acquired by means of simulation. Knowing someone’s character is a matter of
knowing about their deeply held beliefs, the sorts of things which they are likely to
desire under certain circumstances, the things which they value and the degree to
which they value them and so on. There seems to be no principled reason why
knowledge of this sort should be inaccessible to simulation.
Other objections to the view which I am putting forward derive from the
account of the emotions which I have relied upon in my exposition rather than
the role which I have given to simulation. One such objection is this. It might be
argued that in drawing an analogy between emotional responses and perceptual
beliefs, I have run together two distinct phenomena that are involved in
perception, and that once these phenomena are distinguished it is impossible to
make the analogy work in the way in which I want it to.
The two phenomena which I might be held to have conflated are perceptual
experiences to the effect that the world is a certain way, and beliefs formed on the
basis of those experiences. Arguably, the features of perception that make
emotional responses seem like perceptual ones – namely, the passivity of
perception, and the fact that there is something which it is like to perceive the
world as being a particular way – are features of perceptual experiences, not of
beliefs formed on the basis of those experiences. On the other hand, saying that
emotional responses are analogous to perceptual experiences rather than to
beliefs formed on the basis of perception does not do anything to explain the fact
that presented the initial difficulty for the advocate of simulationism – that is to
say, the connection between emotion and rational deliberation.27
To this objection there are two possible responses. One is to deny that there really
are two sorts of phenomena which need to be kept separate here. It is certainly true
that on some accounts of perception there is an important distinction between
perceptual experiences and the beliefs which one forms on the basis of those
experiences. However these accounts are not the only ones on the market. There are
also accounts of perception according to which perception is just a matter of belief
acquisition – albeit one in which the beliefs acquired are particularly rich and fine-
grained (Armstrong 1968). If an account of this sort is correct then the objection fails.
However, one may find this response unsatisfactory. There are, after all, good
reasons for insisting on a distinction between perceptual experiences and beliefs
properly so-called. One such reason is that beliefs are plastic in a way in which
perceptual experience is not. In other words, what one believes depends to a very
large extent on the other beliefs which one has, whereas what one perceives does
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not. This is the lesson which we learn, for example, from the fact understanding the
Muller Lyer illusion does not prevent us from seeing the two lines involved in the
illusion as having different lengths although it does prevent us from coming to
believe that the lines are of different lengths28 (Fodor 1983). What this suggests is
that beliefs have a different functional role from perceptual experiences and it might
be thought that this is a good reason for regarding them as distinct phenomena.
There are difficult points in the philosophy and psychology of perception to
be negotiated here. Nevertheless one point which does not seem especially
controversial is this: the advocate of the view that I am defending can accept the
proposed distinction between perceptual experiences and beliefs, provided that she
also insists that perceptual experiences are to be regarded as having propositional
content. For it is this feature of beliefs, rather than the exact details of their
functional role which is important in explaining the fact that beliefs can function as
inputs to reasoning. This is because for something to function as an input to
reasoning it must be capable of standing as a reason for other mental states, and the
only way that a mental state can do this is by having a propositional structure.
The question of whether perceptual experiences do in fact have a propositional
structure is one which is difficult to answer. One reason for thinking that they do is
that otherwise, for reasons rehearsed in the last paragraph, it is difficult to see how
perceptual experiences can provide us with reasons for beliefs, and that the
consequence of denying that perceptual experiences can provide us with reasons
for belief seems to be to detach our beliefs from any possibility of being justified by
the way that the world is (McDowell 1994: Lecture 3, Brewer 1999). However for my
purposes it is not necessary to argue that the view that perceptual experiences have
propositional content is inescapable, but only to point out that it is a viable, and an
attractive theoretical option.29 Furthermore, it is not undermined by considerations
about the plasticity of belief and the nonplasticity of perceptual experience.
A second objection has to do with the variability of emotional response. De
Sousa raises the possibility that the paradigm scenarios that people are taught to
recognize might be so different that our emotional responses might in fact not be
universally shared (de Sousa 1987: 181–3). That is to say, it might turn out that
there were individuals who responded in a unitary way to situations in which we
could see no common thread. Or, alternatively it might be that people responded
in a unitary way to situations which we could recognize as having something in
common with one another, but which did not arouse any affective response in us.
One response to this worry would be to say that it was the product of a form of
skepticism that has no warrant once we take on board the fact that human beings’
emotional responses are at least partly based in a shared biological nature. Another
would be to say that, to the extent that there are differences between the paradigm
scenarios that different individuals have learnt to respond to, this places a limit on
how well we can expect mental simulation to work. This might also be an area
where we might expect simulation to be helped out by theory from time to time. A
third response would be to draw on the apparent fact that just as we can develop
our perceptual skills, so we can also develop new patterns of emotional response.
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One further worry is what might be called the ‘direction of gaze’ problem. In
one of her earlier papers on mental simulation Jane Heal (Heal 1986) has argued
that in the case of belief attribution – and in particular in the case of belief
attributions which are grounded in shared perceptual experiences the simula-
tionist gets things right by suggesting that we do not start by looking out at the
world, and then to its effect on the perceiver to whom we are attributing beliefs,
but out from the perceiver to the object of their gaze30. On the account of
emotions on offer, something similar ought to apply in the case of emotion
attribution. However, it seems as if in the case of the emotions, this is a
misdescription of what occurs. For it seems as though, when we are attributing
emotions we look to the subject first and foremost, and only as an afterthought to
the world. This is because many emotions, unlike beliefs, have characteristic
bodily expressions which vary from emotion type to emotion type, and our
capacity to respond to such bodily expressions must play some role in explaining
our ability to make successful attributions of emotions. If this were not so, then it
would be difficult to account for the importance that recognizing the
characteristic bodily expression of emotions has for us.
It is not clear what a simulationist’s response to this point ought to be.
However, one possible line of response would be to push the analogy with the
perceptual case even further here. For it seems plausible to say that although we
need to look to the subject in order to tell the modality of the emotional response-
whether it be fear, anger, surprise or whatever this will not be enough to fix the
intentional content of the emotion. For this, we do need to turn from the subject
of the emotion to the aspect of the world which is eliciting the emotional
response. Here, focussing on the behaviour of the subject plays a role which is
parallel to that, in the case of belief attribution, to that of following the direction
of gaze of a subject of perceptual experiences.
VIII
The aim of this paper has been to articulate a plausible account of emotion
attribution in which mental simulation plays a significant role. I do not claim to
have shown that no other account is possible. In particular nothing I have said
rules out the possibility that an advocate of the theory view might be able to
formulate a view in which simulation plays either no role or at best a very
marginal one. However, I do claim by giving a detailed account of the role that
simulation could have in emotion attribution, I have increased the overall
attractiveness of the simulationist view.
Bill Wringe
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NOTES
1 A good introduction to the debate can be found in Davies and Stone 1995a,b. A more
critical recent collection is Kogler and Stueber 2000.
2 I should emphasise here that I take the debate to be primarily one about what
happens when we make mental state attributions, and not, for example, about the nature
of mental state concepts (although a simulationist account of mental state attribution may
have no implications for our understanding of mental state concepts – I am agnostic about
this). See section 2 and footnote 14 below for further discussion.
3 Epistemology of other minds: Goldman 1989, Sorenson 1998; Metaphysical issues:
McDowell 1986; Philosophy of Social Science: Kogler and Stueber 2000; and, for good
measure moral philosophy: Goldman 1995.
4 Since Gordon is a major advocate of the simulationist view who has also written
extensively on the emotions, one might expect to find some discussion – either of what a
simulationist ought to say about emotion attribution or why a simulationist account is not
to be expected in (for example) Gordon 1987. But as far as I can see he has nothing directly
relevant to say about the issues being discussed here. (One might think that the view of
emotions which Gordon puts forward is incompatible with the simulation view, since he
seems to hold that a grasp of some kind of theory is needed for understanding emotion
concepts, but I am not sure this correct. See footnote 15 for discussion of a related but more
general point. In any case, this is not a line of thought which he makes explicit.)
There is some discussion of issues relevant to the topic of this paper in Goldie 1999,
Ravenscroft 1998 and Adams 2001. Goldie, whose views I discuss below, seems mostly
concerned to argue that simulationism plays at best a fairly marginal role in mental state
attribution. To that extent his views and mine are opposed. Ravenscroft argues that the
case of the emotions provides an experimentum crucis between the theory view and
simulation view – a claim which is challenged by Adams (see footnote 5 below). However,
neither of these papers address the question of what a simulationist acccount of emotion
attribution might look like in detail.
5 I take it as being relatively widely accepted that the theory view can provide some
account of emotion attribution. Ian Ravenscroft (Ravenscroft 1998) has argued that such an
account cannot explain the fact that when we know what emotion someone is experiencing
we often know what it feels like for them to experience that emotion. But see Adams 2001
for a rebuttal of this suggestion.
6 In particular most serious attempts at giving a philosophical account of emotions
take seriously the fact that emotions have intentional objects. This fact, and the related
point that full-blown emotion attributions do not just involve recognising what kind of
emotion is being experienced but also correctly identifying the intentional content are ones
which the simulation view is well-equipped to deal with. (By contrast accounts of emotion
which, following Ekman (Ekman 1971: 2) stress the role that recognition of characteristic
facial expression in emotion attribution strike me as seriously incomplete. Moreover, it is
noticeable that some of those who stress the significance of Ekman’s work in arguing that
the ‘output side’ of emotion is largely stereotypical still accept that the ‘input side’ is
plastic (see for example Griffiths 1990). So an account which tacks on to Ekman’s view a
simple story about our knowledge of a theory about the objects which characteristically
evoke certain kinds of emotion does not seem adequate either.)
7 Conceivably, someone might accept the point that emotions do not play the same
role in deliberation as beliefs typically do, but maintain that they were beliefs nonetheless.
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There is nothing obviously objectionable about this view. However, it does not help the
simulationist with the task of explaining how she could give an account of the attribution
of such atypical beliefs.
8 One might worry that by focussing on similarities between emotion and perception,
we weaken the case for a simulationist account of emotion attribution – at least if (as many
think) perception is not just a species of belief. But even if this view of perception is correct,
I shall argue below (pp. 366–7) that perception shares with belief just those features which
make a simulationist account of belief attribution viable. See below for further discussion.
9 Because this is a schematic overview I shall not discuss every objection which has
been made to the simulation view. In particular I shall not attempt a detailed discussion of
the issue of whether the simulation view can avoid collapsing into a version of the theory
view. This is a question which has been discussed at great length in the literature and
which I take to have been resolved in the affirmative. But see footnotes 14, 15 and 16 below
for further discussion and for more extended treatments Gordon 1995b, Heal 1998b,
Wringe 2000.
10 Since very few defenders of the theory view defend explicit views about the nature
of theories in general this fact does not place a very strong constraint on the details of the
position they hold. Nevertheless, it is worth making explicit, if only to make clear that
advocates of the theory view are generally conscious of the need to avoid using the term
theory so loosely as to evacuate it of meaning.
11 Advocates of the simulation strategy sometimes argue that there is in fact an
important difference of principle between these different sorts of tasks, as a preliminary to
arguing that the theory view of mental state ascription cannot possibly be correct. This is
not a view which I am defending here, although I am sympathetic to it. For my purposes it
is enough that the simulationist view is an alternative to the theory view.
12 It is worth noticing the modest modal status of this claim. Simulationists need not
hold (although they may) that a tacit theory could not in principle be used to simulate
someone else’s mental processes.
13 Ripstein 1987 argues that not all model building requires a theory of the domain
being modelled. This may be correct. All I am saying here is that some cases of model
building may require the possession of a theory about the domain being modelled.
14 Of course I may need to believe that the model simulates human blood flow
accurately before I am prepared to use it for making predictions. But even if one is
extremely generous about what is to count as a theory, it is implausible that a single belief
like this could constitute one.
15 Note that on the simulationist view it is the similarities themselves rather than the
fact that any individual believes these similarities obtain which is crucial here.
16 For a simulationist view of mental state attribution to be coherent it needs to be at
least consistent with a plausible account of the nature of mental state concepts. Some
people hold that since, on the best accounts of mental state concepts, grasp of such
concepts involves the possession of a theory, the simulationist view is unacceptable.
This line of argument dismisses the simulation view too cheaply. There is no obvious
reason why a simulationist account of mental state attribution should not be combined
with a view according to which the meanings of mental state terms are fixed by one’s
grasp of certain platitudes about mental states along the lines proposed by Lewis (Lewis
1966, 1972). This does not constitute a complete capitulation to an advocate of the theory
view because the simulationist can insist that while a grasp of these platitudes is required
for an understanding of mental state concepts it does not go very far towards explaining
the vast range of mental state attributions that people are actually capable of making.
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I should add that I am only conceding that an account of this sort is likely to be the best
account of mental state concepts for the sake of argument. It’s worth noting that people
who think that the meaning of mental state terms is fixed in this way typically provide
only indirect arguments for thinking that an appropriate set of platitudes can be found,
and that at least some of the arguments for thinking that such a set of platitudes must exist
is that they must do so if our ability to ascribe mental states to other people is not to be a
mystery. (For a particularly blatant example of this, see Jackson and Pettit 1987) This
procedure clearly begs the question against the simulationist, who is proposing an
alternative account of mental state ascription.
I should also note that there is some disagreement in the literature as to whether a view
of the sort suggested here is really open to the simulationist. I follow Jane Heal (Heal 1998)
and disagree with Peter Carruthers and George Botterill (Carruthers 1996: 37, Botterill and
Carruthers 1999) in thinking that if a mixture of theory and simulation is involved in
mental state ascription, this counts as a victory for the simulationist. This is because, as
Heal points out, the upshot of a mixed position is that the standard cognitive science
strategy for explaining human capacities is not the right way to explain our capacity for
mental state ascription; and that this is true for principled reasons to do with the nature of
the mental, and which has no parallel in other cognitive domains. But this discussion is
tangential to the main concern of this paper, which is not to decide whether a particular
view is rightly called simulationist, but to make a claim about what form emotion
attribution can take if simulation plays some role in the process.
17 Nussbaum 1991 discusses but rejects such a view.
18 The view might plausibly if tentatively be attributed to Solomon 1973.
19 It is perhaps worth making it clear that this account is intended to be a version of
the simulationist view, albeit one that turns out to be unsatisfactory in accounting for our
ability to ascribe emotions
20 It is possible that the arguments put forward in this section explain why Gordon
seems unwilling to give a simulationist account of emotion attribution. In particular his
views about the disanalogies between emotions and action (Gordon 1987: chapter 5) seem
relevant here.
21 de Sousa’s views are sometimes criticised for being unduly accommodating to
social constructivism. One ground for this charge might be his idea that we have to be
taught to recognise that certain situations are relevantly similar to the paradigm cases. But
while it is certainly true that de Sousa writes like a social constructivist at times (eg de
Sousa 1986: 183–4) it is not clear that the basic view that I am attributing to him needs to be
read in a social constructivist way. The fact that we have to learn to see certain things as
similar to other things in significant ways need not mean that the similarities themselves
are not ‘out there’ in the world. Furthermore, as Griffiths has pointed out (Griffiths 1990),
most theorists of emotion are prepared to conceded that there is room for variability in the
objects of emotions on what is often called the ‘input side’ of emotions: the weak point of
social constructivism is the claim that output sides of emotions are socially constructed.
22 I should emphasise that I am only claiming that this is an advantage of the account
of the emotions under discussion, not that it supports the simulationist account of emotion
attribution which I am arguing for.
23 For clarity’s sake I should say the point of this paragraph is only to discuss a
possible objection to the particular account that I am putting forward, not to discuss the
more general charge that simulationism must collapse into a version of the theory view
(e.g. because this is the only way to avoid Cartesianism). This issue has been discussed at
length in the literature but is not my main concern here. See footnote 16 for further brief
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discussion and Wringe 2000: chapter 6 for a chapter length discussion of the charge of
Cartesianism.
24 Griffiths is notoriously hostile to what he calls ‘propositional attitude’ accounts of
emotions (see Griffiths 1997: chapter 2). So one might wonder whether one could
consistently hold the view that affect programs were a natural kind and (a restricted
version of) de Sousa’s view that they are analogous to perceptual responses. However,
although Griffiths regards de Sousa as holding a version of the propositional attitude view
it is notable first that Griffiths does not discuss de Sousa’s views directly; secondly that the
criticisms that he makes of the specific views which he does discuss do not seem to apply
to de Sousa because, unlike most members of the tradition that Griffiths discusses, he
holds that emotions are not to be analysed as being constituted even partly by beliefs and
desires; thirdly that since de Sousa is not interested in providing analyses of emotion terms
in non-emotion terms he does not engage in much of the pumping of linguistic intuitions
that Griffiths finds philosophically objectionable; and most significantly that Griffiths
concedes (Griffiths 1990: 43, footnote 1) that the general arguments which he takes to
dispose of the propositional attitude view do not have as much force against de Sousa as
other propositional attitude theorists. (Furthermore Griffiths association of de Sousa with a
social constructionist view in this footnote seems wrong-headed for reasons discussed in
footnote 21 above.) Finally, one of the most notable claims that Griffiths makes when
arguing for a distinction between emotions and higher cognition is that emotions are
modular. But that should be no obstacle to seeing emotions as analogous to perception
(and hence as propositional attitudes if perceptions are to be counted as propositional
attitudes – see pp. 366–7 below for relevant discussion) given the widely held view that
perception is modular (Fodor: 1983).
25 Why not argue for a simulationist account which applied only to higher cognitive
emotions and not affect programs? One reason is that one might well think that no
unifying account of the higher cognitive emotions can be given. In that case one would
have good prima facie grounds for being skeptical about the viability of a general account of
the attribution of higher cognitive emotions.
26 See inter alia Currie 1990 and Walton 1991 for detailed explorations of these issues.
27 I am grateful to Berys Gaut for insisting on this objection.
28 I am grateful to Daniel Stoljar for drawing my attention to the relevance of this
point.
29 For criticisms of the view see Bermudez 1998: chapter 3, and Peacocke 2001.
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